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Bengal Famine Death Toll: The Count That Closed in June 1944 (Cold Files 027)

21 hours ago
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Cold Files 027 title card: Bengal Famine Death Toll, the count that closed in June 1944. Stats: 688,846 registered excess deaths in 1943 (Famine Inquiry Commission); 1.5 million, the Commission's estimate for January 1943 to June 1944; 2.1 million, a later scholarly estimate (Maharatna 1996).

In May 1945 a commission appointed by the Government of India published its report on the famine that had swept Bengal two years earlier. It gave a death toll of about 1.5 million. That figure went into the official record, the textbooks of the late colonial era and, for decades, most short accounts of the catastrophe.


Part of the Cold Files series.


Today the most widely cited scholarly figure is about 2.1 million, and the best-known economist to study the famine, Amartya Sen, settled on roughly 3 million. The gap is not a matter of one side lying and the other telling the truth. It comes from three choices the Commission made, all written into its own report: which registers to trust, how much to add for the deaths they missed, and when to stop counting. This file follows each of them back to the page.


The number in the report

The Famine Inquiry Commission was set up under Ordinance XXVIII of 1944 and met for the first time in New Delhi on 18 July 1944. It was chaired by Sir John Woodhead, a former Indian civil servant. Its members were B. V. Ramamurty, Sir Manilal Nanavati, M. Afzal Husain and the nutrition scientist W. R. Aykroyd. Its Report on Bengal appeared in May 1945.


The opening page of the report gives a range, not a point: between one and two million people died as a result of the famine. Later in the same report the Commission writes of perhaps one and a half million dead, and that is the figure its mortality chapter arrives at. Bengal then had a population of about 60.3 million.


The famine came out of a war. Japan took Rangoon in March 1942 and cut Bengal off from Burmese rice. A cyclone struck the coast in October 1942 and damaged the autumn rice crop. The provincial government never formally declared a state of famine. The Commission concluded that earlier help from the Army, two months sooner, would have considerably reduced the dying. In a footnote it also did a grim piece of arithmetic: every death, it calculated, was matched by roughly a thousand rupees of excess profit made on rice.


A register kept by watchmen

The Commission did not count the dead itself. It used the deaths registered by the Bengal Public Health Department, and it was blunt about what those registers were worth. Deaths in rural Bengal were reported by the village chowkidar, a part-time watchman, usually illiterate and poorly paid, who passed them to the Union Board office along with a stated cause.


In 1943 that system bent under the weight it was asked to carry. The report records that unpaid chowkidars deserted their posts, that weeks or months could pass before they were replaced, and that deaths in the meantime probably went unrecorded. People who died on the roads were not registered at all. Registered deaths of infants under one month actually fell in 1943, by 26.8 percent against the average, which the Commission read as a sign of missing records rather than surviving babies.


Its verdict on the whole apparatus was that all public health statistics in India were inaccurate, and that quoting the recorded figures lent them a misleading appearance of precision. It then built its estimate on them anyway, because nothing better existed.


How 688,846 became 1.5 million

The arithmetic starts on page 108 of the report. Bengal registered 1,873,749 deaths in 1943. The average for the five years 1938 to 1942 was 1,184,903. The difference, 688,846, is the registered excess for the year.


Waterfall chart: 688,846 registered excess deaths in 1943, plus an uplift of about 311,000 to the Commission's 'order of one million', plus an implied 500,000 for 1944, reaching the 1.5 million estimate.
How the Famine Inquiry Commission reached 1.5 million: the registered excess for 1943 (688,846), its judgement that the true 1943 excess was of the order of one million, and the 1944 excess it added. The 1944 share shown here is Project Leaflet's arithmetic; the Commission did not state it separately. Source: Report on Bengal, 1945, pp. 108 to 110. Chart: Project Leaflet.

The Commission then raised that figure. It judged that excess deaths in 1943 were of the order of one million, which it described as some 40 percent above the officially recorded mortality. It did not set out a formula for the uplift; it was a judgement. Tim Dyson and Arup Maharatna, re-examining the report in the Indian Economic and Social History Review in 1991, calculated that it implies a correction factor of about 1.45.


It then added 1944. In the Commission's words, the high excess mortality of 1944 had to be added to the toll, and on that basis about 1.5 million deaths occurred as a direct result of the famine and the epidemics that followed it. The report never prints the 1944 component on its own. Subtracting one million from 1.5 million suggests about half a million, but that is our subtraction, not the Commission's.


And it closed the door on anything larger. One line in its mortality chapter reads: "We have found no valid reason for accepting estimates in excess of this figure."


The count that stopped in June 1944

The Commission's 1944 data ran only to June. Full-year figures were not available when it wrote. In the first half of 1944 Bengal registered 981,228 deaths, an excess of 422,371 over the average for those months. In the second half of 1943, the worst six months, it registered 1,304,323 against a normal 626,048.


Grouped bar chart: July to December 1943, 1,304,323 registered deaths against a normal average of 626,048; January to June 1944, 981,228 against 558,857.
Registered deaths in Bengal by half-year against the normal average, as given by the Famine Inquiry Commission. The Commission's data stopped in June 1944. Source: Report on Bengal, 1945, p. 108. Chart: Project Leaflet.

The dying did not stop in June 1944. Arup Maharatna's 1992 doctoral thesis at the London School of Economics, which reworked the Bengal registration data year by year, cites Dyson's finding that famine excess mortality began in June 1943 and lasted until the middle of 1945. Maharatna's table of all-Bengal registered deaths shows 1,908,622 in 1943 and 1,726,870 in 1944, against an average of 1,203,507 for 1941 and 1942. Only in 1945 did the registered total come back close to that baseline.


Bar chart of registered deaths in Bengal: 1,908,622 in 1943, 1,726,870 in 1944, 1,238,133 in 1945 and 1,068,996 in 1946, against a 1941 to 1942 average of 1,203,507.
All-Bengal registered deaths, 1943 to 1946, against the 1941 to 1942 average. 1944 was almost as deadly as 1943 on the registers, and the Commission's estimate covered only its first half. Source: Arup Maharatna, The Demography of Indian Famines, LSE PhD thesis, 1992, Table 5.2. Chart: Project Leaflet.

Maharatna also noticed a small discrepancy: his 1943 total is slightly higher than the Commission's, by about 35,000, and he suggests the Commission may have used a provisional figure. Even the registered count moved after the report was printed.


The Commission's own data also show what killed people. Between July and December 1943, 479,039 deaths from malaria were recorded, 266,208 above the average. Between January and June 1944 there were another 400,901, an excess of 223,664. Malaria, by the Commission's reckoning, accounted for 41.5 percent of the excess deaths of 1943. Starvation opened the door; epidemics did much of the killing, and they ran on after the food came.


The figure that came first

Before the Commission reported, a higher number was already in circulation. K. P. Chattopadhyay of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Calcutta had estimated the 1943 toll from surveys of sample groups in the worst-hit areas. The Commission's report describes his method as assuming that two-thirds of the province's population was equally affected, and gives his total as 3.75 million (the line is hard to read in the scanned copy consulted). Most later accounts cite it as 3.5 million; Maharatna's thesis, drawing on Sen, lists it as a minimum of 2.7 million.


The Commission rejected it outright, calling it unjustifiable to estimate a provincial death rate from a sample of that kind, and suggesting exaggerated figures had gained credence because famine deaths were so visible. Maharatna's review of the estimates flags the same weakness: a sample probably unrepresentative of Bengal as a whole. On this point the Commission and its later critics are on the same side.


Range chart of Bengal famine death estimates: Famine Inquiry Commission 1.5 million; Maharatna thesis 1.82 to 1.91 million; Maharatna 1996, 2.1 million; Sen 2.7 to 3.0 million; Greenough 3.5 to 3.8 million; Chattopadhyay 3.75 million as reported by the Commission.
Six estimates of famine deaths in Bengal, with the period each covers where stated. Sources: Famine Inquiry Commission 1945; Sen 1981; Greenough 1982; Maharatna 1992 thesis and 1996 book, as cited by Ó Gráda and van der Eng. Chart: Project Leaflet.

Three million, and then 2.1 million

Amartya Sen's 1981 book Poverty and Famines reopened the count. As Maharatna's thesis reconstructs it, Sen used post-war census publications for West and East Bengal, measured deaths in 1943 to 1946 against a 1941 to 1942 baseline, and corrected for under-registration with a factor of 1.51, taken from a 1955 study that found registered deaths were about two-thirds of the true total. His calculations came out between about 2.6 and 3.05 million, and he settled on a round figure of around 3 million. Paul Greenough's 1982 history went higher still, to 3.5 to 3.8 million, largely building on Sen's work, according to Dyson and Maharatna.


The correction then ran the other way. Dyson and Maharatna pointed out that the registration data for undivided Bengal had nowhere been used in the famine literature, and went back to them. Applying Sen's own method to the all-Bengal registers for 1943 to 1945, Maharatna's thesis arrived at about 1.8 to 1.9 million excess deaths. His 1996 book put the figure at about 2.1 million, which the economic historian Pierre van der Eng cites as 3.5 percent of Bengal's 1941 population. Cormac Ó Gráda wrote in 2007 that the scholarly consensus was about 2.1 million.


Maharatna's thesis puts the debate in one line: "The quantum of excess mortality has understandably constituted a hotly debated issue." Every serious estimate since 1945 is higher than the Commission's, and every one of them still rests on the same chowkidars' registers, corrected by someone's judgement.


The best case for the Commission

The Commission's figure deserves a fair hearing, and it has one.


It was not a whitewash in tone. The same report criticised the handling of the crisis, judged that earlier Army help would have considerably reduced mortality, and printed the profit-per-death calculation. Its members were not hiding from the scale: their first page allowed for up to two million dead. Its refusal to accept 3.5 million was correct, by the standards of every later demographer. Its claim that registration improved at the end of 1943, making the first half of 1944 reasonably accurate, is plausible; a provincial effort to restore the system is in the record. And Maharatna reads the registers as showing that the famine's excess deaths had faded by the middle of 1945, so a window that runs to the end of 1946, as Sen's does, may count deaths the famine did not cause.


What the defence cannot answer is the calendar. A count that ends in June 1944 cannot include the excess deaths of the following twelve months, and the Commission's own data show that the first half of 1944 was still running far above normal. Its uplift for missed deaths was a single judgement for 1943, and Maharatna's table notes it made no allowance for under-registration in 1944 at all. The 1.5 million was an honest estimate made too early, from registers its authors distrusted, and then fixed in place by the line refusing anything higher.


Eight decades on, the most precise figures in this history are the registered ones: 688,846 excess deaths in 1943, and a register that stayed far above normal for another year. Everything else, from 1.5 million to 3 million, is a correction laid over a watchman's ledger. The commonly cited 2.1 million is the best current reading of that ledger. The 1.5 million was the ledger read halfway through.


Should an official inquiry publish a death toll before the deaths have stopped? Tell us in the comments.


Sources consulted

  • Famine Inquiry Commission, Report on Bengal, Government of India, May 1945: Part I (introduction, pp. 1 to 107) and Part II, Death and Disease, chapters I and II (pp. 108 to 120), scanned copy via indiaofthepast.org

  • Arup Maharatna, The Demography of Indian Famines: A Historical Perspective, PhD thesis, London School of Economics, 1992, chapter 5 and Tables 5.1 and 5.2

  • Tim Dyson and Arup Maharatna, "Excess mortality during the Bengal famine: a re-evaluation", Indian Economic and Social History Review 28(3), 1991, pp. 281 to 297

  • Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford, 1981 (as reconstructed by Maharatna 1992 and cited by Wikipedia)

  • Paul R. Greenough, Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943 to 1944, 1982 (as cited by Dyson and Maharatna 1991 and Wikipedia)

  • Arup Maharatna, The Demography of Famines: An Indian Historical Perspective, Oxford University Press, 1996 (as cited by Pierre van der Eng and Wikipedia)

  • Pierre van der Eng, Mortality from the 1944 to 1945 famine in Java, Indonesia, ANU Centre for Economic History Discussion Paper 2024-01 (for its citation of Maharatna 1996)

  • Cormac Ó Gráda, "Making Famine History", Journal of Economic Literature, 2007 (as cited by Wikipedia), and Ó Gráda, conference paper on the Bengal famine, University of Warwick, 2015

  • Britannica, Bengal famine of 1943

  • Wikipedia: Bengal famine of 1943; Famine Inquiry Commission (for secondary citations only)



Next in the Cold Files: the 1944 deportation of the Chechens and Ingush, and what the NKVD's own figures say about the dead.

Cold Files is a twice-weekly deep read from Project Leaflet. For the daily situation reports and every new file, follow The Leaflet on Telegram: t.me/TheLeaflet.


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