Putin's Army Expansion: A Fourth Decree, 10,000 North Koreans, and a 27 Percent War Budget

In brief: In one 24 hour window, Putin signed his fourth army expansion of the year, Reuters surfaced budget documents raising Russia's 2027 war spending by 27 percent, and Zelensky warned that 10,000 more North Korean troops are being selected for deployment. Together they read as one decision: Russia is financing and manning this war deep into 2027.
Part of our Russia Military Capabilities coverage.
Putin's army expansion decrees have become a metronome of this war, and on Monday the beat landed again. The order signed September 28 raises Russia's authorized armed forces to 2,441,630 people, of them 1,550,500 military personnel, an increase of 15,500 active duty slots and the fourth such raise this year, per the Moscow Times and Euronews. A modest number on its own. Read alongside the other two documents from the same 24 hours, it is not.
The same evening, Zelensky used his nightly address to report fresh GUR findings: Russia has, in his words, already begun an additional mobilization, and Pyongyang is preparing its next echelon. By Monday night, Reuters had the draft budget documents raising Russia's 2027 defense line 27 percent, to the highest level of the war. The channel reads the three together, because Moscow clearly wrote them together.
Putin's Army Expansion by Decree: 1.55 Million on Paper

Vladimir Putin, 2026. Photo: Kremlin.ru via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0
The decree itself explains nothing, and as the Moscow Times notes it gives no reason for the increase. 15,500 troops is small next to the early war's single big raises: 137,000 in August 2022, 169,400 in December 2023, 180,000 in September 2024. What changed is the cadence: quiet increments, four decrees in 2026 alone, some 52,500 new positions this year per the Moscow Times, most of them active duty.
The quiet is the point. Putin has publicly dismissed talk of a new mass mobilization, per the Moscow Times, and the Kremlin remembers why: the September 2022 call up of 300,000 sent hundreds of thousands of men fleeing the country, the war's most dangerous domestic moment for the regime. But that mobilization decree was never rescinded, and Euronews cites Ukrainian intelligence assessments that Russia intends to bring in around 300,000 people this year and roughly the same again next year, through contract recruitment, coercion of conscripts, and what Zelensky calls "various methods." Independent analysts cited by Euronews note the catch: contract sign ups are shrinking despite record bonuses. Hence the third lever.
10,000 More North Koreans: Pyongyang's Second Echelon

Putin and Kim Jong Un, Pyongyang, June 2024. Photo: Kremlin.ru via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0
"Today, the GUR reported on the measures that Russia is planning," Zelensky said in his September 28 address, per the Kyiv Independent. "In fact, the Russians have already begun additional mobilization, they are increasing the number of people they are recruiting using various methods." Among those methods, he said, Moscow plans to "increase the involvement of foreigners."
The concrete number: more than 8,000 North Korean troops are on Russian territory now, and roughly 10,000 more are "being selected for training and subsequent deployment," per Zelensky via Reuters. Ukrainian and South Korean estimates put Pyongyang's total contribution since 2024 at 14,000 to 15,000 troops, most of them committed to the Kursk axis, alongside millions of shells, ballistic missiles, and long range artillery, also per Reuters.
The channel has tracked this pipeline before: North Korea's missile troops are already inside Russia since the summer. What Zelensky added on Monday is the price tag. In exchange for the manpower, he said, Russia has helped Pyongyang stand up its own attack drone manufacturing, with Shahed type drones now being built in North Korea, per the Kyiv Independent and NK News. That is a technology transfer with consequences far beyond this front.
The 27 Percent Budget: 17.1 Trillion Rubles for 2027

A Russian refinery burns after a Ukrainian strike. Photo: ArmyInform, CC BY 4.0
The money confirms the manpower. Draft budget documents reviewed by Reuters set 2027 defense spending at 17.1 trillion rubles, about $202.6 billion, a 3.6 trillion ruble jump over the earlier plan and the highest war budget of the invasion. Across 2025 to 2027, Reuters tallies roughly 50 trillion rubles, about $592 billion, for defense. The draft goes to the Duma by October 1, where the new supermajority for war will not blink, and it lands on top of missile factories already running at 120 percent of plan.
The strain shows in the fine print, per the Reuters documents via Defense News: the 2026 deficit estimate has been revised from 1.6 to 3.2 percent of GDP, net borrowing in 2027 rises 43 percent to 7.7 trillion rubles, the oil and gas revenue forecast has been cut from 8.9 to 7.6 trillion rubles, and Moscow is reaching into the National Wealth Fund for another 459 billion rubles, around 11 percent of its remaining liquid portion. Ukraine's refinery campaign, from the Perm refinery drone strike on down, is a direct input into that revenue line: Zelensky reported fresh strikes on defense plants and oil facilities again on September 28, per ArmyInform.
ISW's September 28 assessment supplies the strategic read: Putin is betting on a "new theory of victory" built on expansive long range ballistic missile and jet powered drone strikes, and likely intends to force Ukraine to capitulate before spring 2027. The budget and the decrees are how he buys the attempt. The strikes are already here: this week's wave hit Kyiv's National Academy of Sciences and a business center in Dnipro, killing at least nine people nationwide and wounding more than 80, and 90 of the roughly 120 drones Russia fired on Monday were jet powered, per Al Jazeera. Zelensky says Ukraine is intercepting 57 percent of the jet type, with new interceptors in active testing.
Why It Matters
Everything in this package points one direction: Moscow is not resourcing a ceasefire, it is resourcing 2027, with Kyiv's energy ceasefire offer still unanswered. A state expecting to stop shooting soon would not raise its war budget by a quarter, grow its army four times in a year, or trade drone factories for foreign infantry. Ukraine's General Staff put cumulative Russian losses at 1,532,500 on September 28, a claimed figure, but one that explains why the Kremlin needs all three levers at once: the arithmetic of attrition no longer closes with domestic recruitment alone.
What to Watch
Watch October 1, when the draft budget reaches the Duma, and where money moves between procurement and payroll. Watch for the first confirmed sightings of the new North Korean echelon, and whether it appears on the Kursk axis again or inside occupied Ukraine, which would be a legal and political escalation. And watch the recruitment ads inside Russia: if the bonuses spike again this winter, the contract pipeline is failing, and the quiet mobilization will have to get louder.
The channel will be tracking all three. For the live feed as it happens: t.me/TheLeaflet.
Read next: Russian Air Force Losses 2026: What's Left, Base by Base and Jilin Chemical Fiber: The Chinese State Firm in Russia's Shahed Supply Chain.
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A question for the room: if contract recruitment is shrinking and North Korea is filling the gap, how many foreign troops does Russia need before this is formally a coalition war? Drop your read in the comments, or tell the channel what to cover next.
Sources
Reuters budget documents via Meduza and Defense News (Sep 28, 2026), Moscow Times (Sep 29, 2026), Kyiv Independent (Sep 28, 2026), Euronews (Sep 29, 2026), Reuters via Korea Herald and Business Recorder (Sep 28-29, 2026), NK News (Sep 29, 2026), ISW via Kyiv Post (Sep 28, 2026), ArmyInform (Sep 28, 2026), Al Jazeera (Sep 29, 2026). Photos: Kremlin.ru via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 4.0; ArmyInform, CC BY 4.0.
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