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Ukraine Front Line, November 2026: Ground Gained, Ground Lost, and Why the Counters Disagree

6 days ago
8 min read

In brief: Russia has now lost more ground than it took for two months running, by ISW's count, and its 2026 pace of advance has collapsed to a fraction of last year's. Ukraine's biggest gains are on the Oleksandrivka axis around Komar and at Lyman. Russia is still pushing at Dobropillia and Kostiantynivka. The three main counters disagree on October, and the official Ukrainian numbers run higher than the independent ones. This edition lays out all of it, side by side. Part of our Ukraine War Analysis coverage.

Project Leaflet stat card: Ukraine front line, November 2026. 800+ square kilometers retaken on the Oleksandrivka axis per Kyiv, a Russian net loss of 108 square kilometers in September and October per ISW, and a Russian pace of 0.38 square kilometers per day in 2026 per ISW.
Project Leaflet stat card, November 2026. Figures: Kyiv (Oleksandrivka axis), ISW (net change and pace).

This week a widely shared post claimed Ukraine had retaken 760 square kilometers in Donetsk and that Russian troops were retreating toward Velyka Novosilka. The channel went looking for the number. Nothing we found supports 760 or the post's 440 square kilometer figure for Komar. But the direction of the claim holds up, and the full ledger is more interesting than the viral version. Our September front line survey found the counters arguing over whether Russia was gaining at all. In November they still argue, but only about how much ground Russia is losing.

The Scorecard: Russia's Advance in Three Numbers

Start with pace. By ISW's count, the ground Russia took in the first ten months of 2026 adds up to 117.38 square kilometers. That works out to 0.38 square kilometers a day, against 13.25 a day in 2025 and 9.9 a day in 2024, per Al Jazeera's analysis of ISW data. The turn came in April, when ISW recorded Russia's first net monthly loss of ground since Ukraine's Kursk incursion in August 2024: 116 square kilometers.

Bar chart: average square kilometers taken by Russia per day. 9.9 in 2024, 13.25 in 2025, 0.38 in 2026 through October.
Russia's pace of advance collapsed in 2026. Data: ISW via Al Jazeera. Chart: Project Leaflet.

Then the autumn. In September ISW assessed that Russia seized 175.54 square kilometers but lost 256.35, a net loss of 80.81. In October it seized 139.85 and lost 167.14, a net loss of 27.29, the second losing month in a row. Across the six and a half months of Ukraine's Oleksandrivka offensive, from January 29 to August 12, ISW counted Russia seizing or infiltrating 382.98 square kilometers while losing 233.74.

Grouped bar chart of ground Russia seized versus lost per ISW: January 29 to August 12, 382.98 seized and 233.74 lost; September, 175.54 seized and 256.35 lost; October, 139.85 seized and 167.14 lost.
Since September, Russia has lost more ground than it has taken. Data: ISW. Chart: Project Leaflet.

The price has gone the other way. Ukraine's General Staff counted 54,400 Russian troops killed or seriously wounded in October, the highest monthly figure it has reported since the full-scale invasion began. That number is Kyiv's and cannot be independently verified.

October: Three Counters, Two Answers

Here is where honest reporting gets harder. The three counters most people cite do not agree on October:

  • ISW: Russia lost a net 27.29 square kilometers in the calendar month.

  • Kyiv: Zelensky said on November 1 that Ukraine liberated 96.2 square kilometers in October, 10.4 more than Russia took.

  • DeepState: Russia gained a net of about 47 square kilometers over the four weeks to October 26, per the Russia Matters war report card.

Horizontal bar chart of Russia's net change in October: ISW minus 27.29 square kilometers, Kyiv official minus 10.4, DeepState plus 47 over four weeks to October 26.
Two counters say Russia lost ground in October; one says it gained. Data: ISW, Office of the President of Ukraine, DeepState via Russia Matters. Chart: Project Leaflet.

The gap has three causes. The windows differ: a calendar month against four weeks ending October 26. The method differs: ISW books areas Russian troops have infiltrated without holding them as contested, not as Russian gains. And timing differs: DeepState often maps Ukrainian gains weeks late for operational security. In September it revised its numbers and found Ukraine had regained at least 108 square kilometers in May and June that had not been mapped at the time. Our reading: the sign is still in dispute, the scale is not. Russia is moving tens of square kilometers a month, not the hundreds it took last winter.

Oleksandrivka and Komar: The Biggest Ukrainian Gain of the Year

Ukraine's largest gains this year came where Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts meet. The Air Assault Forces opened an offensive on the Oleksandrivka axis on January 29. It got its fastest start in February: between February 11 and 15, by AFP's analysis of ISW data, Ukraine retook 201 square kilometers in five days, its biggest short-term gain since June 2023. That came days after Ukraine and SpaceX began cutting Russian units off Starlink.

Two Ukrainian soldiers of the 25th Air Assault Brigade kneel on a dirt track preparing improvised FPV strike drones.
Drone crew of the 25th Sicheslav Air Assault Brigade, part of the Air Assault Forces, with improvised FPV strike drones in Donetsk Oblast, July 2023 file photo. Photo: ArmyInform, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

On August 12, Zelensky said the offensive had retaken 745 square kilometers and 26 settlements. ISW's own mapping was more conservative: 626.69 square kilometers across the Oleksandrivka direction and the northern edge of the Huliaipole direction combined. On October 27 Zelensky put the total above 800, and Air Assault Forces commander Oleh Apostol repeated that figure on November 13 for two operations. He also said Kyiv had revised some earlier numbers after changing how it counts ground Russian troops had only infiltrated.

Bar chart comparing official and conservative counts of ground retaken: Oleksandrivka axis, 745 square kilometers claimed by Kyiv versus 626.69 mapped by ISW; Operation Vivaldi, 277 claimed by the 3rd Army Corps versus Zelensky's more than 200.
Official claims run ahead of the conservative counts. Data: Air Assault Forces, ISW, 3rd Army Corps, Office of the President. Chart: Project Leaflet.

Komar is where the fighting has moved this autumn. The village sits about 14 kilometers north of Velyka Novosilka, the hub that supplies Russian units across the southeast. In late October, military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian troops had retaken Perebudova, Komar and Fedorivka, with Russia still holding the northeastern edge of Perebudova. ISW described the gains as slow but tactically significant. According to Mashovets, Moscow moved elements of the Baltic Fleet's 120th Naval Infantry Division, the Pacific Fleet's 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 90th Tank Division into the sector, units that had been meant for other axes.

What the campaign has not done yet is reach its main objective. In August, the Conflict Intelligence Team noted that Ukraine had not cut the Huliaipole to Velyka Novosilka road near Temyrivka and Uspenivka. That road, not the square kilometer count, is the test for whether Russia's southeastern supply line is really in danger.

A Ukrainian soldier holds up an FPV strike drone with an attached warhead over a green field.
Ukrainian strike drone readied by an air assault drone crew, April 2024 file photo. Photo: ArmyInform, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

Lyman: Vivaldi Closes at 277

In the north, the 3rd Army Corps ended Operation Vivaldi on October 14. Commander Andriy Biletskyi put the total at 277 square kilometers and more than 16 settlements, with at least 8,000 Russian casualties and about 270 captured. The final phase alone retook 101 square kilometers, including Zelena Dolyna, Lypove and Kolodiazi. Zelensky's own figure is lower, more than 200 square kilometers, and the gap has not been explained. DeepState independently confirmed the 51 square kilometers of phase three.

The ground matters more than the number. Vivaldi pushed Russian forces off the Sloviansk to Kramatorsk highway and eliminated the bridgehead on the Chornyi Zherebets river that Russia needed to come at both cities from the north. Our Vivaldi phase three deep dive covers how the corps did it.

Kupiansk: Holding the Line, Underground

Kupiansk has produced no big area figure, and that is the point. The 2nd Khartiia Corps' Operation Veles sent assault troops more than 15 kilometers through gas pipelines to hit Russian positions from behind, claiming more than 100 Russian losses and over 30 prisoners. It was counter-infiltration, not a land grab: closing the routes Russia used to seep into the city. See Operation Veles.

A Ukrainian soldier holds a fiber-optic FPV drone with a large cable spool attached.
A fiber-optic FPV drone, immune to radio jamming, during testing, February 2025 file photo. Photo: ArmyInform, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

Where Russia Is Still Pushing

A net loss across the front does not mean Russia has stopped attacking. It means its gains in a few sectors are smaller than its losses elsewhere.

Dobropillia is the sharpest edge. Reuters reported on November 3 that DeepState's map showed Russian forces advancing up to 10 kilometers north in two prongs on the section between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, with forward units reported at the Dobropillia to Kramatorsk road. By DeepState's November 12 map, 8 percent of Dobropillia itself was grey zone, double the figure two days earlier. Ukraine says it has blunted part of this: Apostol said on November 13 that a Ukrainian operation near Dobropillia halted an offensive involving substantial Russian marine forces.

A Ukrainian PT-91 tank fitted with an anti-drone cage sits among bare trees in a forest in Donetsk Oblast.
Ukrainian PT-91 tank with an anti-drone cage in Donetsk Oblast, January 2025 file photo. Photo: ArmyInform, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

Kostiantynivka is the slow grind. ISW recorded a Russian advance in the city's northwest on November 4 and assessed that Russian troops had likely consolidated positions there. In the south, Russia has held Huliaipole since February, but ISW found no confirmed Russian advances around the town on November 3 and 4.

A destroyed market street in Kostiantynivka after a Russian missile strike, with collapsed stalls and debris.
Kostiantynivka after a Russian missile strike, September 2023 file photo. Photo: Donetsk Regional State Administration (dn.gov.ua), CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

Moscow's own messaging has gone quiet. United24 Media's review of Russian military statements found no claims of a captured settlement between November 1 and 8, after weeks of near-daily announcements. The last ones, on October 28, named Alisivka in Kharkiv Oblast and Barylivka in Sumy Oblast.

Claims vs Checks

Every side inflates. On October 16 Putin claimed Russia had taken around 6,500 square kilometers and 310 settlements since January. ISW's count for the first ten months is 117.38. Gerasimov claimed about 500 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast since September, while ISW recorded a net Russian loss for that period. Putin also told his commanders Ukraine holds just over 10 percent of Donetsk Oblast. As our Donbas map report showed, DeepState puts it at about 20 percent.

Kyiv's numbers run high too, if far less wildly: 745 square kilometers on the Oleksandrivka axis against ISW's 627, and 277 at Lyman from the corps against Zelensky's 200-plus. The channel's rule: lead with the independently mapped figure, give the official claim beside it, and label which is which.

What the November Map Means

Russia still sets the tempo of the fighting. What it has lost in 2026 is the ability to turn that pressure into ground. Apostol's line for it: taking one tree line in a month is hardly an operational success. Ukraine, short on infantry, has found a formula that works in pockets, blinding Russian drones and logistics first and then moving in small teams. It has not yet produced a breakthrough. Winter is the next test: bare tree lines expose troops on both sides to drones, and fog has helped Russian infiltration before.

The map also sits on the negotiating table. At the Abu Dhabi talks this month, Russia argued from control it does not have. Every verified square kilometer cuts against the case that Ukraine should trade land it holds for a ceasefire.

What to Watch

  • ISW's November monthly tally, due around December 1: a third straight month of Russian net losses, or a turn?

  • DeepState's November total, and whether it confirms the Komar and Perebudova gains.

  • The Dobropillia to Kramatorsk road. If Russia can hold positions on it, the town's supply lines are in trouble.

  • The Huliaipole to Velyka Novosilka road near Temyrivka and Uspenivka, the objective the Oleksandrivka offensive has not yet reached.

  • Northwestern Kostiantynivka, where Russia is consolidating.

Which sector decides the winter: Komar, Dobropillia or Kostiantynivka? Tell us in the comments, or send the channel the next sector you want broken down.

For the intel between the deep reads, the channel runs all day on Telegram at t.me/TheLeaflet, and the morning brief lands here in The Daily Sitrep.

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